Supercharging the EV transition: A response to the House of Commons Transport Committee's Call for Evidence from the Finance & Leasing Association

Introduction

1. The Finance & Leasing Association (FLA) is the leading trade body for the UK asset, consumer and motor finance providers of leasing and hire purchase. In 2024, FLA members provided £156 billion of new finance to UK businesses and households, £116 billion was in the form of consumer credit, accounting for almost a third of all new consumer credit written in the UK. £52 billion of it supported the purchase of new and used cars, including around 80% of private new car registrations.
2. The FLA welcomes the opportunity to respond to the House of Commons' Transport Committee's Call for Evidence to its inquiry, *Supercharging the EV transition*.

Summary

3. The Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Mandate has been effective in driving the supply side of the transition to electric vehicles (EVs), but uptake has remained below target in both years of its operation to date.
4. Inconsistency and contradictions in government policy have made it more difficult to increase sales of new EVs to consumers.
5. Some Government policies actively reduce the incentive to switch. The decision to withdraw the EV exemption from Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) from April 2025 and the announcement of plans for Electric Vehicle Excise Duty (eVED) at Budget reduce the benefits of switching.
6. The eVED proposals are particularly damaging. It is difficult to think of a clearer example of contradictory policies than the Government's intention to introduce a new tax on driving EVs in the same year that sales of them will need to pass one million for the first time to meet mandated targets.

7. The new and used car markets are symbiotic in nature but the lack of support for used car buyers wanting to switch to an EV is the most obvious omission from the Government's transition plans.
8. FLA data shows that consumers still typically borrow over £4,200 more to buy a used EV than is the case for a used petrol car adding weight to calls for support for transition in this market.

a. How effective have Government policies been in driving EV adoption to date, and what further action is required to accelerate take-up?

9. When considering how effective Government policies have been in driving EV adoption to date, we have previously stated to Government that the ambition does not reflect reality. There are various reasons for this including changes to public policy, a lack of sufficient charging infrastructure and low customer demand.
10. Here policy can be considered under three broad categories: policy direction, financial support, and regulatory intervention.
11. Policy direction on EV transition has been characterised by the constantly shifting nature of the ambition. David Cameron's COP 21 commitment "to make all passenger vehicle sales zero emission vehicles by 2050"[1] was tightened to 2040 by Theresa May's government through announcements in July 2017[2] and May 2018[3]; Boris Johnson tightened the timeline still further by announcing the 2030 and 2035 targets in 2020[4]. Rishi Sunak moved in the opposite direction in 2023 by delaying the phase out of petrol and diesel cars and vans to 2035[5]; a change that was itself reversed by confirmation of Labour's 2024 manifesto commitment at the following Autmn Budget with final details in April 2025.
12. As the House of Commons' Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee put it in 2018, "*The unclear messaging from Government is damaging and unfair to those companies wishing to drive the transition to EVs. The Government cannot rely on expectations alone to deliver desired policy outcomes*."[6] Although this was said in reference to the 2040 targets, the point is just as true today as it was then.
13. A similarly unhelpful pattern is discernible in the history of financial support for EV transition.
14. The Plug in Car Grant (PiCG) was introduced in 2011 to help bridge the upfront price difference between ultra-low emission cars and their internal combustion engine

[1] Gov.UK, UK government pledges bold ambition for electric cars, 3 December 2015, Click here.
[2] Gov.UK, Plan for roadside NO2 concentrations published, 26 July 2017. Click here.
[3] Gov.UK, PM speech on science and modern Industrial Strategy: 21 May 2018, Click here.
[4] Gov.UK, "Government takes historic step towards net-zero with end of sale of new petrol and diesel cars by 2030" 18 November 2020, Click here.
[5] Gov.UK "Government sets out path to zero emission vehicles by 2035" 28 September 2023. Click here.
[6] House of Commons' Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, Electric vehicles: driving the transition, 19 October 2018, paragraph 16, p12.

equivalents[7] but saw successive reductions in generosity applied from October 2018, March 2020, March 2021 and Dember 2021[8] on the path to eventual scheme closure in June 2022. This progressive whittling of support diminished the grant from a £5,000 discount applied to new EVs and petrol hybrid EVs to a £1,500 discount to new EVs under £32,000.

15. At the point of discontinuation there were less than half a million EVs[9] in a UK car parc of over 33m and battery electric cars accounted for just 16%[10] of the UK new car registrations in that year (2022). This was clearly too soon to withdraw support for consumer demand.

16. The House of Lords' Environment and Climate Change Committee agreed stating, "*Unlike markets across Europe the Government has removed incentives to support private buyers with upfront costs for EVs. This is premature as we seek to move from early adopters and fleets purchasing EVs to a wider proportion of the population*."[11]

17. Just over three years after the PiCG closed, the Government effectively acknowledged the point when it reinstated government grant support for consumer new EV purchases through the announcement of the Electric Car Grant (ECG) with an initial budget allocation of £650m in July 2025[12].

18. Although the ECG would have benefitted from wider consultation and further development prior to launch, it is a welcome development overall as was the Autumn Budget 2025 announcement of an increase in the threshold at which motorists with new EVs must pay the VED Expensive Car Supplement (ECS) from £40,000 to £50,000[13].

19. In this instance, positive interventions to support EV transition represented by the introduction of ECG and the ECS threshold increase are counteracted with the demand dampening decisions to end the Vehicle Excise Duty exemption for electric vehicles from April 2025, and to introduce the new Electric Vehicle Excise Duty (eVED) from April 2028. We further note that EV drivers will no longer be exempt from the London congestion charge from 2 January 2026 onwards.

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[7] Office for Zero Emission Vehicles, Plug-in Car Grant Vehicle Application Form and Guidance Notes Version 8.0. December 2021 p4 (Click here)
[8] Office for Zero Emission Vehicles, Plug-in Car Grant Vehicle Application Form and Guidance Notes Version 8.0. December 2021 p4 (Click here)
[9] Gov.UK, Plug-in grant for cars to end as focus moves to improving electric vehicle charging, 14 June 2022, Click here.
[10] Gov.UK, Department for Transport & the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, Accredited official statistics
Vehicle licensing statistics: 2022, Published 15 June 2023, Click here.
[11] House of Lords Environment and Climate Change Committee, "EV Strategy: rapid recharge needed." 1st report of Session 2023-24, February 2024, p4.
[12] Gov.UK, Department for Transport and Office for Zero Emission Vehicles, Written statement to Parliament Electric Car Grant launched, 15 July 2025, Click here.
[13] HM Treasury, *Budget 2025: Strong Foundations, Secure Future*. 26 November 2025, p121 para 4.242.

20. These measures reduce the financial incentives to switch to EVs at the point in the transition where support for customer demand is most important.
21. The period from commencement of the ZEV mandate to the end of Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) new car sales in 2030 is one of acute vulnerability for manufacturers as the ever more demanding EV sales targets exist alongside the option for the customer to purchase ICE alternatives from both new and used markets. The stock of good condition ICE alternatives to EVs available from the used car market will persist into the 2030's.
22. Moving to regulatory intervention, the most effective policy to date for driving EV transition is the ZEV mandate.
23. This is unsurprising. It imposes statutory requirements backed with potentially severe penalties, and the relatively small number of highly visible duty holders makes enforcement against non-compliance a relatively simple task.
24. The weakness in the policy is that it only provides for half of the equation. Supply is mandated; demand for that supply is not.
25. A crude industry-level analysis of the EV market growth required to absorb the supply mandated by the annual ZEV mandate targets without using flexibilities or shrinking ICE production, suggests that - from a 2023 base - demand would need to double by 2026, triple by 2029 and nearly quadruple by 2030. The 2035 EV market would need to be more than five times its 2023 size to absorb production within these parameters.
26. The optimism of this trajectory is arguably reflected in the flexibilities provided in the initial mandate. It is further debatable that the need to announce additional flexibilities in April 2005 – while necessary and welcome - reflects the weakness and inconsistency of policy on the demand side of the equation.
27. Regarding the level of success that government policy overall has had in driving EV transition to date, it is difficult to see it as anything other than below par as compared to the mandate targets it set.
28. EV market share in 2024 – the first year of the mandate – was 19.6[14]% against a mandate target of 22%. The target was missed again in 2025 with 23.4%[15] falling short of the 28% mandate target despite manufacturers providing discounts worth more than £5bn[16]. That discounting at this level is simultaneously unsustainable and insufficient is a serious cause for concern.
29. Looking ahead, the targets for the remainder of the decade look increasingly difficult to meet, with the steep increases in requirements for 2028 (52%), 2029 (66%) and

[14] Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, "Record EV market share but weak private demand frustrates ambition" 6 January 2025. Click here.
[15] Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, "UK new car market breaches two million as almost one in four buyers go electric" 6 January 2026. Click here.
[16] BBC News, Electric car discounts are unsustainable, says industry group, 6 January 2026. Click here.

2030 (80%). From 2028, sales will need to pass 1 million new EVs a year to remain on course; more than double the 473,348 new registrations in 2025[17].

30. Perhaps nowhere else in EV transition policy is the phenomenon of individual policy measures pulling in opposite directions better illustrated than the plans for 2028, for which year the government is simultaneously intending to increase the annual EV sales target from 38% to 52% and introduce an additional tax on driving them.
31. Progress will continue to fall below target for so long as policy incoherence is allowed to persist.
32. Regarding what further action is required to accelerate take-up; the Government needs to consider the basket of relevant policies as a whole and ensure that all measures within it are supporting delivery rather than undermining it.
33. 2026 has already seen speculation that the government is considering cutting VAT on public EV charging in response to expected dampening of demand as a result of eVED[18] introduction. Notwithstanding the need to reduce public charging costs, the use of one tax policy measure to mitigate the avoidable downsides of another is incoherent and risks adding to the confusion and complexity of transition policy.
34. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how manufacturers will ever be able to meet ZEV mandate sales targets while policy works so actively to undermine demand.
35. At very least, the review of the ZEV mandate targets due in 2027 needs to be brought forward and the introduction of eVED needs to be significantly delayed.
36. The Government must also address lack of support for consumer demand in the used EV market which has been conspicuous by its absence for some time. This will be covered in more detail in the answer to question “e”.
37. Finally, the government should prioritise meaningful progress on addressing the cost of public charging through the review announced at Budget 2025 – to report by Q3 2026 - and accelerate the introduction of battery health certificates.

b. How robust is the current rate of EV take-up relative to the Government’s targets?

38. Much of this is covered in paragraphs 27-30 above, suffice to say that demand remains persistently softer than it needs to be to meet increasingly stretching targets due to a complex range of factors including the effects of recent policy decisions.
39. Even if the premature and counterproductive VED and eVED policy decisions summarised above were sufficiently reversed, the ZEV mandate targets for 2026-30

[17] The 2025 registration figure is from the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, “UK new car market breaches two million as almost one in four buyers go electric” 6 January 2026; the one million sales figure is our own broad estimate.
[18] Carwow.co.uk, Tax cuts on EV charging could save you big money, January 13, 2026. Click here.

inclusive would still be extremely difficult to meet as the market will need to expand beyond the low hanging fruit of new car buyers with driveways who are both conceptually willing and financially able to switch, to the more difficult-to-reach cohorts of the driving public.

c. How effective are existing incentives (such as the Electric Car Grant) in influencing EV take-up, and to what extent might further or different forms of support be required?

40. It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of existing incentives when the government is introducing disincentives at the same time.

41. The ECG provides support for new EV purchases in two bands based on an assessment of the sustainability of their production; £3,750 for the most sustainably produced cars and £1,500 for cars that meet some environmental criteria[19].

42. This element of the design is important as it suggests the primary concern of the policy is to confer advantage on more sustainably-produced new EVs over less sustainably-produced new EVs, as distinct from encouraging consumers to switch from ICE to EV. While the discount should – if passed on in full – assist with closing the purchase price gap between EVs and their ICE equivalents, this does not appear to be the primary focus of the policy.

43. We further draw the Committee's attention to the observation from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) that "*The ECS is an additional VED charge which is spread over five years, commencing a year after the vehicle is first registered, totalling £2,370 for a car purchased in 2025-26.*"[20]

44. For new EVs over the £50,000 threshold, the ECS more than cancels out any benefit to lower tier ECG recipients and reduces the upper tier grant to the point of negligibility when spread over the duration of a multi-year finance agreement.

45. The detrimental impact of bringing EVs into VED is enhanced by its visibility to the customer. Price discounts rapidly disappear into the overall deal accepted by the customer as expressed in their monthly payment to the finance company, whereas the customer is reminded of VED charges via a written demand for payment received annually. In this respect, VED is analogous to council tax and is felt in a similar way by those who pay it.

[19] Gov.UK, Department for Transport and the Office for Zero Emission Vehicles, Written statement to Parliament; Electric Car Grant launched, 15 July 2025.
[20] Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook, November 2025, paragraph 3.38, p76. Click here.

d. What are the likely implications of the introduction of Electric Vehicle Excise Duty (eVED) for the wider EV transition, and what factors should guide the Government's approach to its implementation? What has been the effect of the introduction of VED on zero-emission cars since April 2025?

46. The likely implications of the introduction of (eVED) for the wider EV transition, depend on how well its design and execution are delivered.

47. It has long been recognised that there will need to be a replacement for fuel duty revenues as ICE vehicles are phased out, and it is right that the Government gives thought to this well in advance of it being needed.

48. The right approach would have been to issue a call for evidence on replacement of fuel duty and the future design of road transport taxation, not to issue a consultation on a very specific measure to be implemented in the most challenging single year of the transition timeline.

49. The clearest assessment of likely implications of the introduction of eVED as currently expected is provided by the OBR who "*estimate there will be around 440,000 fewer electric car sales across the forecast period relative to the pre-measures forecast, with 320,000 of this offset by the expected increase in sales due to other Budget measures. {the increase to the expensive car supplement (ECS) threshold for battery electric cars, and expansion of the electric car grant between 2025-26 and 2029-30}*"[21]

50. This suggests that eVED as proposed will more than cancel out the two support measures referenced above with a net deficit of 120,000 EV sales.

51. Regarding what factors should guide the Government's approach to its implementation, much damage has already been done regarding the public signals the policy and its timing have sent, but it is essential that this is not introduced in 2028 as proposed.

52. The effect of the introduction of VED on zero-emission cars since April 2025 has been to reduce the financial benefits of transitioning to EVs by means guaranteed to be keenly felt by those affected. The element of retrospection within the policy – which affects a cohort of EVs purchased before the decision was announced – is unnecessarily punitive. eVED threatens to erode the advantages of EV ownership still further.

[21] Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook, November 2025, paragraph 3.37, p75.

e. How should the Government support further development of the second-hand EV market?

53. Support for the second-hand market is crucial. It is essential for ensuring long-term access to personal mobility for those who rely on a car to get to work and for life more generally. It is also essential because the new and used markets are symbiotic.

54. Most new cars are bought on finance. FLA data shows that Personal Contract Purchase (PCP) accounts for around 80% of point-of-sale finance agreements provided by our members to support consumer new car purchases.

55. Customers typically decide on the affordability of such agreements based on the monthly sum to be paid to the finance company under the agreement. One of the most important factors in setting the value of these monthly payments is the expected value of the vehicle at the end of the agreement, known as its residual value (RV).

56. On average, new cars can lose 20 to 30 per cent of their value in the first year and then around 15 per cent of their value for the next couple of years, normally adding up to 50 per cent or more over three years[22].

57. Put crudely the greater the gap between the purchase price and the anticipated RV, the greater the monthly sum must be to cover the cost of asset depreciation over the lifetime of the agreement.

58. As such, the anticipated RV of a new car in three to five years' time has a direct effect on the cost of new car finance at the point the agreement is signed.

59. RVs for ICE vehicles are well understood based on decades of accumulated data. This allows lenders to anticipate RVs for new agreements with a high degree of confidence, and they can price finance keenly as a result. However, RVs for EVs are less predictable

60. The reasons for this volatility are varied and complex but essentially reflect a disconnect between the type of vehicles entering the used market, and what that market is looking for.

61. An important contributory factor to this is the difference in the specification between the demands of the fleet market - which takes around three quarters of new EV registrations[23] - and the more price sensitive private used car market.

62. In broad terms the fleet market tends to buy higher value/higher specification vehicles than those typically sought in the used market.

63. This increase in the model and specification has implications for both new and used EV markets when the oversupply of high-end vehicles enters the used car market at the end of their time in fleets; typically, three years.

[22] Autotrader, Car Depreciation Explained. Click here.
[23] British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association, BEV registrations up but industry calls for long-term support, 8 October 2024. Click here.

64. In the UK, most car purchases take place in the used market. Typically, this market sees well over 7 million transactions a year compared to circa 2 million in the new market with the majority of these – 63% in 2024 - taking place below £15,000.

65. This market is more price sensitive than the new market and is not supported to buy EVs by either government or manufacturer incentives. So, when the high-end ex-fleet EVs enter the market, they often need to depreciate further to find a price point with demand, and they re-baseline all other EV residual values (RVs) accordingly.

66. While the sharp fall in values may seem superficially beneficial from an affordability perspective, it is not that simple as depreciation losses are reflected in higher lending and leasing rates on these vehicles which affects their competitiveness against ICE equivalents, suppressing demand and ultimately the flow of EVs into the market in future years.

67. It must also be appreciated that there is a floor price for EVs below which the owner would rather keep the asset. This floor price on a high specification ex-fleet EV may still be significantly above the price point where most used car buyers are prepared to transact.

68. While buyers for high end ex-fleet EVs can be found, the level of depreciation required to access the top end of the used car market is higher than anticipated at the time they were initially financed causing significant problems for lending and leasing companies, and yet still insufficient to be accessible to the majority of used car buyers.

69. What is clear is that market sentiment around RV risk is applying upward pressure on the cost of finance in both new and used EV markets.

70. As such we recommend the establishment of a government backed RV guarantee scheme for EVs costing less than £50,000 that depreciate by more than 5% over and above the anticipated RV at the time the business was written. To prevent gaming of the system, the anticipated RV for the purposes of the scheme could be based on the industry standard data.

71. Such a scheme would give lenders the confidence to price more keenly thereby lowering the cost of finance for affordable EVs across the market. The cost cap provides additional protection for taxpayers as they would not be exposed to exceptional depreciation on higher value vehicles. This risk should rightly remain with lenders.

72. The interaction of residual values in the used EV market and pricing of finance in the new EV market makes the relationship between the two markets a symbiotic one. Despite this, and despite the used market being more than three times the size of the new car market, the latter remains unsupported.

73. As such, we strongly recommend the introduction of a used market equivalent of the Electric Car Grant (ECG) scheme to support private buyers of used EVs priced below £50,000. This would have a range of benefits including supporting residual values - which would in turn reduce the cost of financing new purchases - and making the benefits of EVs more affordable to those on lower and middle incomes.

74. Extending grant support to used vehicles would also provide greater value for money for the taxpayer. A fixed value grant will usually be a greater proportion of the sales price of an affordable used EV than an affordable new one, and as such will be a more attractive and effective inducement to switch: £3,750 off a £15,000 used EV is a 25% reduction and brings the price down to £11,250; this would be a comparatively less significant 13% reduction on a new £30,000 EV.

75. For this reason, we would expect grants for used EVs to be more efficient at generating additional EV sales that would not have otherwise happened.

f. What are the most significant factors affecting consumer confidence in EVs, including purchase and running costs, chargepoint availability, concerns about battery longevity, safety and fire risk, and what are the best steps Government and the sector could take to address them?

76. One of the most serious factors affecting consumer confidence in EVs is the misinformation from those who oppose the transition.

77. During the 2023-24 Session, the House of Lords' Environment and Climate Change Committee received considerable evidence from both industry and government on the matter as part of its Inquiry on EVs.

78. This included the following from Richard Bruce, Director of Transport Decarbonisation at the Department for Transport:

> *"I do think there has been an impact from a concerted campaign of misinformation over the last 14 months or so that has been pushing consistent myths about EVs that people absorb and which is reflected in their appetite [for purchasing EVs]. There is an anti-EV story in the papers almost every day. Sometimes there are many stories, almost all of which are based on misconceptions and mistruths, unfortunately"*[24]

79. Recent survey work by the Electric Vehicle Association (EVA) England found that this was the most frequently mentioned barrier preventing more drivers from considering a switch to electric. The themes – and the frequency with which they were mentioned

[24] House of Lords' Environment and Climate Change Committee, EV strategy: rapid recharge needed, 6 February 2024, p11 para 14.

– are as follows: Misinformation and negative media coverage (59%); Lack of home charging/off street parking (52%); High upfront costs (39%); range concerns (37%); and public charging costs (27%)[25].

80. Of the EVA England survey results we draw further attention to the persistence of high upfront costs.

81. Data from the FLA's own research department clearly demonstrates that, although the average amount that consumers need to borrow to buy an EV is coming down, - and may soon reach parity with petrol in the consumer new car market - it remains significantly higher than is the case for petrol vehicles in the consumer used market.

82. The FLA's research data for the period January to November 2025 shows that the average sum advanced through point-of-sale consumer finance agreements for the purchase of EVs is typically around £4,510 higher than the same figure for petrol vehicles in the consumer new car market and £4,215 in the consumer used car market.

83. The persistence of this gap shows the continuing need for price support to assist consumers to switch. It is particularly important in the used car market where the majority of consumer purchases are made and we repeat our call for grants to support used car purchases, either through modification to the ECG or via a new separate grant.

84. It is also worth considering the extent to which the narrowing of the price gap in consumer new car sales – and particularly the sharp reduction seen in the second half of 2025 - is dependent on manufacturer discounts.

85. Although the ECG has helped, the Society of Manufacturers and Traders point out that only around a quarter of models are currently eligible, and that the over £5 billion of subsidies from manufacturers equates to around £11,000 per EV registered[26]. Subsidies at this level are clearly unsustainable.

g. What further action is required to ensure that the rollout of EV charging infrastructure facilitates transition at the necessary rate?

86. Installation of charge points ahead of demand may pose some financial problems for charge point operators. This has been addressed by the Green Finance Institute in its work on Utilisation Linked Finance (ULF). For more information, click here.

[25] The Electric Vehicle Association (EVA) England

[26] Society of Manufacturers and Traders, UK new car market breaches two million as almost one in four buyers go electric, 6 January 2026. Click here.

i. What lessons should be learned from other countries' successes or setbacks?

87. When looking abroad it is worth considering what successive governments have done in Norway, where EV sales reached 88.9% of new car sales in 2024[27]. On its website, the Norwegian EV Association[28] summarises the incentives introduced and supported by successive governments as follows:

    1. No purchase/import tax on EVs (1990-2022). From 2023 some purchase tax based on the cars' weight on all new EVs.

    2. Exemption from 25% VAT on purchase (2001-2022). From 2023, Norway will implement a 25% VAT on the purchase price from 500 000 Norwegian Kroner and over.

    3. No annual road tax (1996-2021). Reduced tax from 2021. Full tax from 2022.

    4. No charges on toll roads (1997- 2017).

    5. No charges on ferries (2009- 2017).

    6. Maximum 50% of the total amount on ferry fares for electric vehicles (2018)

    7. Maximum 50% of the total amount on toll roads (2018-2022). From 2023 70%

    8. Free municipal parking (1999- 2017)

    9. Access to bus lanes (2005-). New rules allow local authorities to limit the access to only include EVs that carry one or more passengers (2016-)

    10. 25% reduced company car tax (2000-2008). 50% reduced company car tax (2009-2017). Company car tax reduction reduced to 40% (2018-2021) and 20 percent from 2022.

    11. Exemption from 25% VAT on leasing (2015-)

    12. The Norwegian Parliament decided on a national goal that all new cars sold by 2025 should be zero-emission (electric or hydrogen) (2017).

    13. Charging right[29] for people living in apartment buildings was established (2017)

    14. Public procurement: From 2022 cars needs to be ZEV. From 2025 the same applies to city buses.

[27] BBC News website, Norway on track to be first to go all-electric, 13 January 2025.
[28] The Norwegian EV Association, Norwegian EV policy: https://elbil.no/english/norwegian-ev-policy/
[29] Residents in apartment buildings are entitled to request installation of a personal EV charging point ("charging right" law in effect since 2017): Source European Alternative Fuels Observatory. Click here.

15. 2023: The Norwegian Parliament launches a new goal: In 2030 all new heavy-duty vehicles must be zero emissions or run on biogas.

16. 2025: Practically all new passenger cars sold, are EVs. Norway reaches 10 000 fast chargers and 800 000 EVs.

88. It is reasonable to conclude that Norway's success owes much to the willingness of successive governments to sustain investment over a significant period, and to seek to grant advantage to the BEV driver wherever the driver and state interact.